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On the Relation between the Late Antique and Byzantine Christological Discourses

*Observations about Theodore the Stoudite's Third Antirrheticus**

Abstract: In his *Third Antirrheticus* Theodore the Stoudite made use of older texts. An important source of inspiration was an excerpt from John Philoponus' treatise *Arbiter* that was included in the *Doctrina Patrum*, together with glosses by an unknown Chalcedonian theologian. In one argument Theodore follows the Chalcedonian glossator in rejecting Philoponus' view that hypostatic idioms only distinguish from each other members of the same species. Yet in another argument he reproduces a definition of hypostasis that had been formulated by Philoponus in order to explain what he means by a certain human being. As a result he can no longer uphold the difference between hypostasis on the one hand and certain human being or individual on the other, which was the mainstay of his icon theology.

At the heart of the iconoclast controversy was the question whether the devotion shown to images of Christ was idolatry or a legitimate expression of the Christian faith. Yet neither iconoclasts nor iconophiles contented themselves with debating religious practice. They also sought to disqualify their adversaries by presenting them as followers of Late Antique heretics. According to iconoclast authors the belief that the incarnated Word could be represented through images necessarily resulted in a Nestorian Christology whereas iconophiles accused their opponents of holding Monophysite views. Thus one can ask: how much did the iconoclasts and iconophiles of the eighth and ninth centuries know about Late Antique Christological speculation? were they conversant with the ways in which the formula of Chalcedon had been explained and defended against attacks? These questions are of great importance. If we can answer them we can get a much better understanding of the Byzantine theological discourse. The present article focuses on the *Third Antirrheticus* of Theodore the Stoudite, which contains arguments that seek to relate the debate about icons to the controversies about the incarnation.

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Theodore the Stoudite (759–826) is undoubtedly one of the most impressive figures in Byzantine history. Scion of a family of high-ranking bureaucrats he received a sound grammatical and rhetorical education. Later he became caught up in the coenobitic revival of the late eighth century and decided not to follow in his father's footsteps but to become a monk¹. When the Second Iconoclasm broke out, Theodore, by then an abbot, became one of the leaders of the iconophile faction. In letters and treatises he developed a theological model that could justify the veneration of images of Christ². In

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¹ On Theodore's biography see Th. PRATSCH, *Theodoros Studites (759–826) zwischen Dogma und Pragma (BBS 4)*. Berlin 1998. On his activity as abbot and spiritual father see R. CHOLIJ, *Theodore the Stoudite. The Ordering of Holiness (Oxford Theological Monographs)*. Oxford 2002.

² There exists a rich secondary literature on Theodore's icon theology. See V. GRUMEL, *L'iconologie de saint Théodore Stoudite*. *EO* 20 (1921) 257–268; P. ALEXANDER, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople: Ecclesiastical Policy and Image-Worship in the Byzantine Empire*. Oxford 1958, 191–194; J. MEYENDORFF, *L'image du Christ d'après Théodore Stou-*

order to make his case he had to show first of all that Christ was depictable. He did so by claiming that the human nature of Christ was endowed with individual characteristics, which could be perceived by the senses. Such a theory had to be formulated with great care since otherwise it might result in a heretical position. The problem is aptly summarised by Tollefsen: “Theodore must show exactly how human nature exists in a particularised way in Christ, without achieving a hypostatic status of its own.”³ If it was not solved, Theodore’s icon theology could be denounced as Nestorian. Theodore’s take on this “problème épineux” was to distinguish between individualisation and hypostatisation⁴. He averred that endowment with hypostatic idioms in itself did not constitute a hypostasis and that the individualised human nature could therefore be assumed into the one hypostasis of the divine Word⁵.

Theodore did not create this argument from scratch. It is already found in Late Antique theological texts. His indebtedness to tradition has long been recognised. There is agreement that Theodore adopted the concept of a composite or common hypostasis from his Chalcedonian forebears. Yet it is not so easy to establish which texts were available to him. Bratu, for example, suggests that he adopted Leontius of Byzantium’s concept of *enhypostaton*⁶. This hypothesis, however, must be rejected since in his treatise *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* Leontius makes it clear that the flesh as *enhypostaton* is not individualised⁷. It was only in the seventh century that individual characteristics were attributed to the *enhypostaton*⁸. Since Theodore never refers to the concept we do not know whether he was familiar with it at all⁹. We are on firmer ground when we can identify outright quotations from earlier Christological writings. Study of the contexts in which these quotations originally appeared reveals that Theodore knew different models and that he chose the one that he considered most suitable. He did not, however, always succeed in integrating existing arguments into his own conceptual framework.

The relevant passages are found in the first section of Theodore’s *Third Antirrheticus*, which bears the title “about the depiction on images of Christ in the body” (περὶ τῆς ἐν σώματι εἰκονογραφίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ)¹⁰. The first to be discussed starts with the summary of an iconoclast argument, which Theodore then refutes.

dite, in: *Synthronon. Art et archéologie de la fin de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Age*. Paris 1968, 115–117; IDEM, *Le Christ dans la théologie byzantine*. Paris 1969, 253–263; C. SCOUTERIS, *La personne du Verbe Incarnée*, in: *Nicée II, 787–1987. Douze siècles d’images religieuses*, ed. F. Boespflug – N. Lossky. Paris 1978, 121–133; Ch. SCHÖNBORN, *L’icône du Christ. Fondements théologiques*. Paris 1986, 217–234; H. G. THÜMMEL, *Bilderlehre und Bilderstreit. Arbeiten zur Auseinandersetzung über die Ikone und ihre Begründung vornehmlich im 8. und 9. Jahrhundert*. Würzburg 1991, 46–51, 110–114; K. PARRY, *Depicting the Word. Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries*. Leiden – New York – Cologne 1996; M. BRATU, *Quelques aspects de la théorie de l’icône de S. Théodore Stoudite*. *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 77 (2003), 323–349; G. TSIGARAS, *Ἡ εἰκονολογία τοῦ Θεοδώρου Στουδίτη*. Salonika 2011; Ch. ERISMANN, *Venerating Likeness: Byzantine Iconophile Thinkers on Aristotelian Relatives and their Simultaneity*. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 24 (2016) 405–425; T. Th. TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite’s Defence of the Icons. Theology and Philosophy in Ninth-Century Byzantium (Oxford Early Christian Studies)*. Oxford 2018.

³ TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite* 87–88.

⁴ See BRATU, *Quelques aspects* 337.

⁵ See MEYENDORFF, *L’image du Christ* 116; IDEM, *Le Christ* 253, 257; SCHÖNBORN, *L’icône du Christ* 220–221; SCOUTERIS, *La personne* 131; THÜMMEL, *Bilderlehre und Bilderstreit* 47; BRATU, *Quelques aspects* 335–337.

⁶ See BRATU, *Quelques aspects* 337. See also TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite* 73.

⁷ See D. KRAUSMÜLLER, *Making sense of the formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos*. *Vigiliae Christianae* 65 (2011) 484–513.

⁸ See B. GLEEDER, *The Development of the Term ἐνπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 113)*. Leiden – Boston 2012, 144–145.

⁹ On the same problem in another context, see PARRY, *Depicting the Word* 109.

¹⁰ *Antirrheticus* III, 1 (PG 99, 389C–416C). The remaining parts of the *Third Antirrheticus* (PG 99, 417A–436A) are devoted to other aspects of Theodore’s icon theology, such as the question of veneration. Theodore’s other works are equally irrelevant

Ἀντίθεσις ὡς ἐκ τῶν Εἰκονομάχων· Εἰ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει ἀνείληφε τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν φύσιν ὁ Λόγος· ἐπειδὴ αὐτὴ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀσχημάστιτος, εἰ σχηματισθεῖ διὰ περιγραφῆς ἕτερον πρόσωπον εἰσκριθήσεται τῇ Χριστοῦ ὑποστάσει· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· καὶ τῆς Νεστορίου αἰρέσεως σύμμαχον, δυάδα προσώπων ἐν Χριστῷ πρεσβεύειν¹¹.

(Objection as from the iconoclasts: If the Word has assumed the human nature into his own hypostasis, since he [sc. the Word] is invisible and lacking in shape, if he were given shape by circumscription, another person would be introduced into the hypostasis of Christ. But this is absurd and supportive of the Nestorian heresy, to advocate a duality of persons in Christ¹².)

The purpose of this argument is to prove that Christ cannot be depicted. It is averred that acceptance of such a possibility would result in a Nestorian position, that is, it would amount to acceptance of two separate, human and divine, hypostases in the incarnated Word. Disqualifying a new theological position by comparing it with teachings that had been condemned in the past was a time-honoured practice¹³. What is more startling is the fact that the argument is at odds with Chalcedonian orthodoxy. The iconoclasts' claim that the shape of the humanity must be dissolved because the divinity has no shape is highly problematic. It directly contradicts the creed of Chalcedon, which asserts that the hypostasis of the incarnated Word contains the properties of the human and divine natures without confusion. If one took the argument at face value, one would have to conclude that it reflects an extreme Monophysite position¹⁴. It can, of course, not be excluded that Theodore manufactured the argument. However, one should not dismiss the possibility that it was formulated by an iconoclast author. After all, Emperor Constantine V had also reasoned in a manner that laid him open to accusations of Monophysitism¹⁵.

It is evident that this argument could be knocked down with a feather by anyone who had an inkling of Chalcedonian theology. Indeed, Theodore makes short work of it in his response.

Πρὸς τοῦτο λύσις· Εἰ τὴν προσληφθεῖσαν σάρκα ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου ἰδίαν ἔχειν ὑπόστασιν ἔφαμεν, εἶχεν ἂν τὸ εἰκὸς ὁ λόγος. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν δόξαν, τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασιν κοινήν γενέσθαι τῶν δύο φύσεων ὑπόστασιν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑποστήσασαν, μετὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοειδῶν ἀφοριζόντων αὐτὴν ἰδιωμάτων, εἰκότως τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασιν ἀπερίγραφτον μὲν φαίημεν κατὰ τὴν τῆς θεότητος φύσιν· περιγεγραμμένην δὲ κατὰ τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐσίαν· οὐκ ἐν ἰδιοσυστάτῳ καὶ ἰδιοπεριγράφῳ προσώπῳ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἐσχηκυῖαν· ὡς ἂν μὴ εἴη φύσις ἀνυπόστατος· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει) ὡς ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένην καὶ περιγραφομένην.¹⁶

to the issue. He sets out various aspects of his icon theology in his letters, ed. G. FATOUROS, *Theodori Studitae Epistulae (CFHB, Series Berolinensis 31)*. Berlin, I 1990, II 1992. See *Ep.* 57 (I 164–168 FATOUROS), *Ep.* 409 (II 568–570 FATOUROS), *Ep.* 428 (II 599–600 FATOUROS), *Ep.* 499 (II 737–738 FATOUROS), *Ep.* 528 (II 788–791 FATOUROS), *Ep.* 546 (II 825–827 FATOUROS). The hypostatic idioms of the human nature are mentioned in *Ep.* 380 (II 514 FATOUROS), without further discussion of their ontological status. The same applies to the *Second Antirrheticus* (PG 99, 352–388), the *Refutation of the Iconoclast Poems* (PG 99, 436–477), the *Problemata* (PG 99, 477–485), and the *Seven Chapters* (PG 99, 485–497). The only exception is *Antirrheticus I*, 3 (PG 99, 332B–334A), for which see note 34.

¹¹ *Antirrheticus III*, 1, 22 (PG 99, 400C2–9).

¹² Translation by Th. CATTOI, *Theodore the Studite: Writings on Iconoclasm (Ancient Christian Writers 69)*. New York – Mahwah, NJ 2015, 95, with modifications.

¹³ On this phenomenon in general, see M. F. WILES, *Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries*. Oxford 1996.

¹⁴ See PARRY, *Depicting the Word* 101; TSIGARAS, *Ἡ εἰκονολογία* 202–203.

¹⁵ See L. BRUBAKER – J. F. HALDON, *Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, c. 680–850: A History*. Cambridge 2010, 180, 192.

¹⁶ *Antirrheticus III*, 1, 22 (PG 99, 400C10–D11).

(Solution for this: If the flesh that has been assumed by the Word had its own hypostasis this would be a valid argument. But since *according to ecclesiastical doctrine we confess that the hypostasis of the Word has become the common hypostasis of the two natures, which hypostasises in itself the human nature together with the idioms that separate it from the other members of the same species*, we naturally call the same hypostasis of the Word not circumscribed as regards the nature of the divinity, but circumscribed as regards our substance, which is not in a person that has *its own constitution and circumscription beside the hypostasis of the Word*, but has gained its existence in it, so that the nature may not be without hypostasis, and is contemplated in it as in an individual and is circumscribed¹⁷.)

In his refutation of the iconoclast position Theodore appeals to the concept of the common hypostasis of the Word, which contains both the divine and the human nature. He avers that in this common hypostasis the properties of the two natures, circumscription and non-circumscription, remain unmixed. This is entirely in keeping with the Chalcedonian position as it had been defined in the fifth and sixth centuries. Indeed, Theodore takes care to exclude a potential Nestorian reading of his argument. He avers that the human nature is not a separate hypostasis but has its existence within the divine Word. In this context he introduces an element that has no counterpart in the iconoclast argument. Alongside the common human nature he mentions the characteristic idioms that mark out the individual and that are also assumed into the common hypostasis, so that the human nature is fully individualised, just as the divine nature is. It is not difficult to see why Theodore included this element. If one wished to prove that Christ's human nature could be represented through images, insisting on the fact that it was circumscribed was not enough. It also needed to have individual characteristics such as a particular shape of the nose.

Theodore's argument is not without precedent. This becomes evident when we turn to the *Doctrina Patrum*, a Chalcedonian handbook of theology from the late seventh or early eighth century¹⁸. There we find a passage from a Monophysite text dating to the middle of the sixth century, the Christological treatise *Arbiter* of the Alexandrian philosopher-theologian John Philoponus, together with a gloss by an anonymous Chalcedonian author that seeks to refute Philoponus' argument¹⁹.

John Philoponus:

Προδιαιτήσθω δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα μηδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον χωρὶς τῆς πρὸς τὸν Λόγον ἐνώσεως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὑπέστη τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀλλ' ἅμα τε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρόδου καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον ἀνείληφεν ἔνωσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνυπόστατον εἶναί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνην, εἴπερ ἰδιοσύστατον εἶχε παρὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἰδιοπερίγραφον τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἰδιώμασί τισι παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντων διακρινομένην.²⁰

¹⁷ My translation. Cf. CATTOI, Theodore 95–96.

¹⁸ *Doctrina Patrum* (ed. F. DIEKAMP – B. PHANOURGAKES – E. CHRYSOS, *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi. Ein griechisches Florilegium aus der Wende des siebenten und achten Jahrhunderts*. Münster 1981). See the introduction to the edition, lxxx–lxxxvii, where Anastasius of Sinai is proposed as author. See also J. STIGLMEYER, *Der Verfasser der Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*. *BZ* 18 (1909) 14–40, who attributes the work to Anastasius Apocrisiarius, a companion of Maximus the Confessor. See also P. ALLEN – B. NEIL, *Maximus the Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile (Oxford Early Christian Texts)*. Oxford 2002, 172–175. In the Georgian translation the author is identified as John of Damascus, see D. CHENGUÉLIA, *Les témoignages choisis dans le Dogmatikon d'Armen d'Iqalho. Une traduction géorgienne de la Doctrina Patrum*. *Le Muséon* 124 (2011) 59–75.

¹⁹ In its entirety the *Arbiter* has come down to us only in Syriac translation. The Syriac text has been discussed and translated into English by U. M. LANG, *John Philoponus and the Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century. A Study and Translation of the Arbiter (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 47)*. Leuven 2001.

²⁰ *Doctrina Patrum* 36 (280, 24–281, 1 DIEKAMP – PHANOURGAKES – CHRYSOS). This quotation can also be found in John of Damascus, *Liber de haeresibus 83 addit.* (ed. B. KOTTER, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos III [Patristische Texte*

(Together with the other points let us also make this preliminary distinction, that, even if the human element of Christ definitely did not gain hypostasis outside the union with the Word even for the smallest amount of time, but received the union with the Word simultaneously with the beginning of its coming to be, we nevertheless say that this nature is not without hypostasis, if indeed it had an existence *with its own constitution and circumscription* beside the other human beings that is separated from all other human beings through some idioms beside the common nature.)

Chalcedonian glossator:

Ἐπισκεπτέον ὡς, ἐν ὅσῳ λέγει ὁ σοφὸς μὴ προϋφεστάναι τῆς ἐνώσεως τὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἀνθρώπινον, παρυφεστάναι λέγει τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἰδιοσυστάτως μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, ἰδίαν αὐτῷ διδοῦς ὑπόστασιν. ἡ δὲ ἐκκλησία οὐχ οὕτως δοξάζει, ἀλλὰ τὸν τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασιν κοινήν γενέσθαι τῶν δύο φύσεων ὑπόστασιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑποστήσασαν μετὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοειδῶν ἀφοριζόντων αὐτὴν ἰδιωμάτων, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο σώζεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι φύσιν ἀνυπόστατον ἐν τῷ τῆν προσληφθεῖσαν φύσιν τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ἐπιγράφεσθαι ὑπόστασιν.²¹

(One must observe that, when the sage says that the human element of the Lord does not exist prior to the union, he says that this same thing has a hypostasis apart in a constitution of its own, giving it a hypostasis of its own. *The church, however, does not believe that it is thus, but that the hypostasis of the Word has become a common hypostasis of the two natures, having hypostasised in itself the human nature together with the idioms that separate it from the other members of the same species*, and in this way it is made sure that there is no nature without a hypostasis, namely through the fact that the assumed nature is attributed to the hypostasis of the Word.)

The similarity of these two passages with Theodore's statement is striking. The exposé of the doctrine of the church in the Chalcedonian gloss reappears in Theodore's text without change. Moreover, the two technical terms ἰδιοσύστατος and ἰδιοπερίγραφος, which are mentioned in the *Arbiter*, are also used by Theodore²². This suggests strongly that Theodore adopted his conceptual framework from the *Doctrina Patrum*, and that he then modified it by adding the elements of circumscription and non-circumscription in order to be able to refute the iconoclast argument²³.

Philoponus' statement and the Chalcedonian gloss are highly significant because they consider the individual characteristics of Christ's humanity. In theological texts from the sixth century these characteristics are usually neglected. For a Monophysite author such as Patriarch Severus of Antioch they were simply an irrelevancy²⁴. Chalcedonian authors found themselves in a more difficult position. Unlike the Monophysites, they applied to the incarnation the distinction between nature and hypostasis that the Cappadocians had introduced into the Trinitarian discourse. This had an unwelcome consequence. According to the Cappadocians, the accession of characteristic idioms to a nature automatically resulted in a hypostasis. Whoever accepted the presence of characteristic idioms in

und Studien 22]. Berlin – New York 1975, 54, 136–142). Note, however, that section 36 may not have been part of the original text. See DIEKAMP – PHANOURGAKES – CHRYSOS, *Doctrina Patrum*, xxxv–xxix, and CHENGUÉLIA, *Les témoignages*, 74–75. For an English translation of the Syriac translation of the passage see LANG, *Arbiter* 192–193, with commentary on pages 66–67.

²¹ *Doctrina Patrum* 36 (280, 3–12 DIEKAMP – PHANOURGAKES – CHRYSOS).

²² According to the database of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* the composite adjective ἰδιοπερίγραφος only occurs in Philoponus' treatise (in the excerpt in John of Damascus' *Liber de haeresibus*).

²³ That Theodore had access to the *Doctrina Patrum* is not surprising. The florilegium was also used by Patriarch Nicephorus, see DIEKAMP – PHANOURGAKES – CHRYSOS, *Doctrina Patrum*, lxxiv.

²⁴ Severus did not distinguish between natural and hypostatic idioms, referring to both with the same term "property", see J. LEBON, *La christologie du monophysisme syrien*, in: *Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. A. Grillmeier – H. Bacht. Würzburg 1951, I, 552.

Christ's human nature thus also seemed to accept the existence of a second, human hypostasis. These problems first surface in the early sixth century in John of Caesarea's *Apologia Concilii Chalcedonensis*. John declares that the human nature does not possess a hypostasis of its own but has gained concrete existence in the hypostasis of the divine Word. Then he explains that this is so because the human nature has no characteristic idioms of its own²⁵. Accordingly, the human nature is individualised only through its union with the divine nature, which already existed as a hypostasis because it possessed the characteristic idiom of generacy²⁶. The same view is held by two theologians of the later sixth century, the priest Pamphilus and Patriarch Anastasius of Antioch²⁷.

By contrast, Philoponus accepts that the human nature has a hypostasis of its own, which is constituted through a set of characteristic idioms²⁸. Coming from a Monophysite this is a rather surprising statement. One would have expected to hear it from a Nestorian. This does, of course, not mean that Philoponus had Nestorian leanings. Like Severus before him, he consistently defines the incarnated Word as one single nature and he furthermore rejects the notion that the human element might have had a separate existence before it was united with the divine Word. This raises the question: how can he then attribute a hypostasis to the human element? Here we need to consider that the terms "with its own constitution", ἰδιοσύστατος, and "with its own circumscription", ἰδιοπερίγραφος, apply only to the relationship between the human element and other human individuals but not to the relationship between the human element and the divine Word. From this argument we can see that for Philoponus, hypostases have their place within the framework of species of which they are instantiations. This is not necessarily a Nestorian position. It is simply a logical consequence of the Cappadocian definition of hypostasis. Characteristic idioms, which establish hypostases, can only be determined through distinction from common natural idioms. This is evidently only possible within one and the same species. Word and flesh, however, belong to different species and can therefore not meaningfully be distinguished from each other through comparison of the hypostatic idioms that separate them from other divine and human beings. Thus one can conclude that the two hypostases of Word and flesh cause no separation between the divine and human element in the incarnated Word. Leontius of Byzantium, a contemporary of Philoponus, expressed a similar view in his treatise *Solutiones*, although his argument was, of course, couched in Chalcedonian terms: he speaks of a human nature and not of a human element within the incarnated Word²⁹.

The Chalcedonian glossator rejects this view. He takes the term "with a constitution of its own", ἰδιοσύστατος, to refer to the relationship between Christ's humanity and divinity. Therefore he has to come to the conclusion that Philoponus introduces two hypostases, which are separate from each other. As a consequence he can discount Philoponus' argument that the human element did not exist before its union with the divine Word. For him this argument changes nothing because even after the union there would be a duality of hypostases. As he expresses it, the human element would then constitute a "hypostasis apart", παρυπόστασις, within the hypostasis of the Word.

At this point the question arises: how does the Chalcedonian glossator avoid such a scenario? Unlike John of Caesarea, Pamphilus and Anastasius of Antioch, he accepts the existence of hypostatic

²⁵ John of Caesarea, *Apologia concilii Chalcedonensis* (ed. M. RICHARD, *Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici opera quae supersunt* [CCSG 1]. Turnhout – Leuven 1977, 55, 183–186).

²⁶ For a more detailed discussion see GLEEDE, *Development of the Term* 54.

²⁷ See Anastasius I of Antioch, *Treatise I*, 3 (ed. S. N. SAKKOS *Opera omnia genuina quae supersunt*. Salonika 1976, 52, 21–23); and Pamphilus, *Chapter 7* (ed. J. H. DECLERCK, *Pamphili Theologi Opus*, in: *Diversorum Postchalcedonensium Auctorum Collectanea I*, ed. J. H. deClerck and P. Allen [CCSG 19]. Turnhout 1989, 176, 82–88).

²⁸ See A. GRILLMEIER – Th. HAINTHALER, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche II.4: Die Kirche von Alexandrien*. Freiburg – Basel – Vienna 1990, 145.

²⁹ See D. KRAUSMÜLLER, *A Chalcedonian Conundrum: the Singularity of the Hypostasis of Christ*. *Scrinium* 10 (2014) 371–391, esp. 363.

idioms in the flesh. Therefore he must explain why such an entity does not constitute a fully-fledged hypostasis. His solution is to separate the notion of concrete existence from the presence of human characteristic idioms, and to speak of an assumption into the one hypostasis of Christ, which gives hypostasis to the human nature *and* to its characteristic idioms. This is a momentous step because it challenges the Cappadocian doctrine that endowment with characteristic idioms automatically turns a nature into a hypostasis. The same conceptual framework can be found in the writings of Maximus the Confessor³⁰. It was probably created because the solution proposed by the sixth-century theologians was considered unsatisfactory. In the new model hypostatic idioms do not constitute a hypostasis but their presence is nevertheless necessary because without them it is impossible for a nature to become hypostasis³¹. This view finds its clearest expression in a late text, Nicetas Byzantius' *Refutatio epistulae ab Armeniae principe missae*, where we read that the divine Word "individualised the human nature with the separating idioms in his own hypostasis", τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν μετὰ τῶν ἀφοριστικῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει ἀτομώσας³².

When we now return to Theodore's *Third Antirrheticus* we can see that he adopts the position of the Chalcedonian glossator and rejects Philoponus' model. In his text Philoponus' "it (sc. the flesh) had an existence with its own constitution and circumscription beside the other human beings", ἰδιοσύστατον εἶχε παρὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἰδιοπερίγραφον τὴν ὑπαρξιν, becomes: "in a person that has its own constitution and circumscription beside the hypostasis of the Word", ἐν ἰδιοσυστάτῳ καὶ ἰδιοπεριγράφῳ προσώπῳ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασιν. This raises the question: does Theodore use a term that would denote a nature that is endowed with characteristic idioms but does not yet possess concrete existence? In order to find an answer we need to consider his claim that the human nature is "contemplated in it (sc. the hypostasis of the Word) as in an individual", ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει) ὡς ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένη. This is a very condensed statement, which can be explicated as follows. The "individual" in which the human nature is seen is not identical with the hypostasis of the divine Word but is a different entity, which is then assumed into the hypostasis of the divine Word³³.

The discussion so far has shown that Theodore makes use of existing Christological arguments, which he adapts to the specific issue of icon worship. Such an approach, however, can only be successful if the source texts are understood correctly. That this is not always the case becomes obvious when we turn to an earlier part of the *Third Antirrheticus*, which responds to another iconoclast objection. According to Theodore, his adversaries argued that the flesh is not "a certain human being", ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος, but "the universal human being", ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, and for this reason does not have individual characteristics, which could be depicted³⁴. The Christological aspect of this argument is not properly developed but one wonders whether it is not ultimately derived from the position of John of Caesarea, Pamphilus and Anastasius of Antioch.

In his refutation Theodore seeks to show that Christ's flesh can indeed be called "a certain human being", just as he can be called "individual".³⁵ One of his arguments takes the form of an interpreta-

³⁰ See Maximus the Confessor, Epistula 13 (PG 91, 556C6–D2).

³¹ On the conceptual problems arising from this model see J. ZACHUBER, Universals in the Greek Church Fathers, in: *Universals in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. R. Chiaradonna – G. Galluzzo. Pisa 2013, 425–470, esp. 466–467.

³² Nicetas Byzantius, *Refutatio epistulae ab Armeniae principe missae* (PG 105, 636B5–9). The text dates to the late ninth century but the argument was undoubtedly adapted from an earlier source.

³³ See MEYENDORFF, *Le Christ* 257; SCHÖNBORN, *L'icône du Christ* 221; TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite* 74.

³⁴ *Antirrheticus* III, 1, 15 (PG 99, 396C11–D5).

³⁵ This is a departure from his earlier position that the flesh is seen in a individual but is not "a certain human being" because otherwise it would be a separate hypostasis. See *Antirrheticus* I, 3 (PG 99, 332D9–333A1): Ψιλὸς μὲν οὖν ὁ Χριστὸς οὐ γεγένηται· μηδὲ γὰρ τῶν τινα ἀνθρώπων (read τὸν τινα ἄνθρωπον) ἀναλαβεῖν φαίη ἂν τις τῶν εὐσεβοῦντων, τὸν δὲ καθόλου, ἧτοι τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴν τὴν ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένην. For the emendation see MEYENDORFF, *Le Christ* 253. Here Theo-

tion of Christ's words in John 8:40: "But now you seek to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth", νῦν δὲ ζητεῖτέ με ἀποκτεῖναι, ἄνθρωπον ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑμῖν λελάληκα.

“Ἄνθρωπον” εἰπὼν, τὴν κοινὴν οὐσίαν δηλῶ. Προσθεῖς δὲ “τίς”, ὑπόστασιν τὴν ἰδιοσύστατον τοῦ δηλουμένου ὑπαρξιν, καὶ ἴν’ οὕτως εἶπω, περιγραφὴν ἐξ ἰδιωμάτων τινῶν συγκειμένην, καθ’ ἃς ἀλλήλων οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κεκοινωνηκότες φύσεως διαφέρουσιν, οἷον Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος. Ὁ οὖν Χριστὸς τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις εἰπὼν· “Νῦν ζητεῖτέ με ἀποκτεῖναι”, εἰ “ἄνθρωπον” ἦν μόνον εἰρηκῶς, εἶχεν ἂν τὸν καθόλου σημάναι. Προσθεῖς δέ· “Ὁς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑμῖν λελάληκα”, τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἦτοι πρόσωπον πεφανέρωκε. Τὸ γὰρ “ὅς” ἄρθρον ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ “τίς” ὀνόματι. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὴν καθόλου φύσιν ἀνέλαβεν, ἀλλὰ μὴν τὴν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένην, ἐφ’ ᾧ καὶ τὸ περιγράφεσθαι πέφυκε.³⁶

(When I say “human being” I indicate the common substance. When I add “a certain”, [sc. I indicate] hypostasis, the existence with its own constitution of that which is indicated, and so-to-speak a circumscription, which is composed from certain idioms, whereby those who share the same nature differ from each other, as for instance Peter and Paul. As Christ, then, said to the Jews: “Now you seek to kill me”, if he had merely said “a human being”, he might have intended to signify the universal “human being”, but when he added “who has told you the truth”, he manifested his own hypostasis or person, for the conjunction “who” has the same meaning as “a certain”. Thus, even if he assumed the universal nature, he assumed it as one that is contemplated in an individual, for this reason the possibility of circumscription exists.³⁷)

At the end of the passage Theodore states clearly that two stages must be distinguished in the incarnation: the human nature was first individualised and then given hypostasis through assumption into the preexisting hypostasis of the divine Word³⁸. By contrast, the argument that results in this conclusion is much less straightforward. Theodore starts by juxtaposing the universal human being with “a certain human being”. The latter part of this statement is borrowed from the section of the *Arbiter* that was included in the *Doctrina Patrum*.

Ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἡγουν πρόσωπον τὴν ἰδιοσύστατον τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως ὑπαρξιν καί, ἴν’ οὕτως εἶπω, περιγραφὴν ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων τινῶν συγκειμένην, καθ’ ἃς ἀλλήλων οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνηκότες φύσεως διαφέρουσι.³⁹

(Hypostasis or person [sc. is] the existence with its own constitution of each nature and so-to-speak circumscription composed of properties, according to which [sc. properties] those who share the same nature differ from each other.)

This statement was not formulated by the Chalcedonian glossator but by Philoponus himself. Its appearance in Theodore's argument is rather surprising since Philoponus was a condemned heretic. It is possible that in his copy of the *Doctrina Patrum* no clear distinction was made between text and glosses. That Theodore should reproduce a definition of hypostasis in order to explain what he means

dore wishes to stress that the Word assumed the entire human nature and not just an individual, in order to make a soteriological point.

³⁶ Antirrheticus III, 1, 17 (PG 99, 397B6–C4).

³⁷ My translation. See also the translation in CATTOI, Theodore 94.

³⁸ See SCHÖNBORN, L'icône du Christ 220; PARRY, Depicting the Word 109.

³⁹ *Doctrina Patrum* (274, 10–13 DIEKAMP – PHANOURGAKES – CHRYSOS). John of Damascus, *Liber de haeresibus* 83 addit. (51, 34–36 KOTTER), For an English translation of the Syriac translation, see LANG, *Arbiter* 190, with commentary on pages 60–61.

by “a certain human being” is odd because in his conceptual framework the two concepts should not be identical. Especially striking is the appearance of the term *ἰδιοσύστατος*. When we analysed the previous argument we saw that Theodore rejected this term because it established independent existence. By contrast, he now accepts that “a certain human being” can be characterised in this way. When applied to the divinity, this would then establish a second, human, hypostasis in the incarnated Word. Such a conclusion can only be avoided when one accepts Philoponus’ theory, which Theodore has explicitly rejected. Theodore seems entirely unaware of the conceptual problem. He declares that by referring to himself as “a certain human being” Christ manifested his own hypostasis or person. In the context this can only refer to a human hypostasis, which is constituted through human characteristics. Here one would have expected Theodore to explain more clearly how the individualised humanity relates to the pre-existing hypostasis of the Word⁴⁰. Accordingly, the conclusion with its reference to the “individual” comes as a surprise. Indeed, the argument suggests that “a certain human being” is equivalent to “individual” and that the latter is therefore also *ἰδιοσύστατος* and hypostasis. One would like to know whether Theodore’s iconoclast adversaries were aware of this shortcoming and exploited it in their refutations.

In order to shore up his position Theodore creates a parallel between individual human beings and the incarnated Word. Such an argumentative strategy only works if both cases fall under the same general rule. Another response to the same iconoclast objection reveals that Theodore did not find it easy to set out such a conceptual framework.

Πρὸς τοῦτο λύσις· Εἰ σάρκα παραδόξως ἀνέλαβεν ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει· ἀχαρακτηριστον δέ, καθὼς φατε, ὡς τὸν τινὰ μὴ σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον, πῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπέστη; τὰ γὰρ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχει· οἷον, ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐν Πέτρῳ καὶ Παύλῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁμοειδέσι. Μὴ ὄντων δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἀνήρηται ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος. Οὐκ οὖν ἐν Χριστῷ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης, εἴπερ μὴ ὡς ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφ’ ἑστέῳσα· καὶ λείπεται φαντασία αὐτὸν λέγειν σεσαρκῶσθαι· καθ’ ἣν οὐδὲ ψηλαφᾶσθαι δύναται ἄν, οὐδὲ χρώμασι διαφόροις περιγράφεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ Μανιχαίων τὸ φρόνημα.⁴¹

(Solution for this: If Christ has assumed the flesh in his own hypostasis in a paradoxical manner, and it is without characteristics, as you say, insofar as it does not signify the particular but the universal human being, how *did it gain subsistence in him?* For universals have their existence in the individuals, as for example, *the humanity in Peter and Paul* and the other members of the same species. If there are no particular beings, the universal human being is eliminated. *Accordingly the humanity is not in Christ if it is not as in someone, having gained subsistence in him*, and all that is left to say is that he has become incarnate in an illusory fashion, according to which he could neither be touched nor be circumscribed in different colours. But such an opinion belongs to the Manicheans.⁴²)

This argument starts with a Christological statement. The universal human nature must have become “a certain human being” because otherwise it could not have gained hypostasis in the divine Word. Here the term *τις ἄνθρωπος* evidently denotes the individualised human nature that is not yet a separate hypostasis. Yet when we consider the argument as a whole matters are much less straightforward. Everything hinges on the general rule that universals gain “existence”, *ὑπαρξις*, in individuals. If one took existence to refer to an ontological state that precedes hypostasis one could argue

⁴⁰ Antirrheticus III, 1, 17 (PG 99, 397B6–C4).

⁴¹ The problem is not seen by SCHÖNBORN, *L’icône du Christ* 220, and TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite* 89.

⁴² See also the rather freer translation by CATTOI, *Theodore* 93.

that “individual” denotes individualised but not yet concrete and independent entities. It is, however, highly unlikely that ὑπαρξίς has such a meaning in this context⁴³. When Peter and Paul are given as examples, it is clear that Theodore uses ἄτομον interchangeably with hypostasis, even though it is synonymous with τις ἄνθρωπος. In order to set out a coherent argument Theodore would have had to create a strict parallel between the case of the ordinary human being and the case of the incarnated Word. Such a conceptual framework would have been available. It is, for example, found in the theological chapters of the Anonymus Rashed where a distinction is made between the “individuated nature”, ἀτομωθεῖσα φύσις, and the hypostasis of Peter⁴⁴. By not taking this step Theodore has considerably weakened his argument. Thus it is not surprising that the transition to the Christological application is awkward. The parallel phrases “the humanity in Peter”, ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐν Πέτρῳ, and “the humanity in Christ”, ἐν Χριστῷ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης, give the impression that the two cases were strictly analogous. Yet this is evidently not the case because Christ, that is, the divine Word, is not a member of the human species. Theodore tries to square the circle in the remainder of the sentence that begins with οὐκ οὖν ἐν Χριστῷ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης, “if it is not as in someone, having gained hypostasis in him”, εἴπερ μὴ ὡς ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφειστώσα. The second part, ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφειστώσα, expresses the Chalcedonian doctrine that the human nature gains subsistence through assumption into the divine Word. By contrast, the meaning of the phrase ἐν τινὶ takes up the term “a certain one”, ὁ τίς, that Theodore has adopted from the iconoclastic argument. Here it must therefore again denote the human nature endowed with characteristic idioms that then gains hypostasis in the divine Word.

Analysis of another passage shows that Theodore was prepared to go much further than most Chalcedonian theologians of the sixth and seventh centuries in regarding the flesh as a fully-fledged ontological entity.

Ο καθόλου ἄνθρωπος προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα· ὁ δὲ τίς, φέρε εἰπεῖν, Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος, τὸ κύριον ἔχων, μετὰ τοῦ κυρίου, καὶ τῷ καθόλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεσθαι. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παῦλος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος κέκληται· ἀλλὰ καθὼς μὲν κοινωνεῖ τοῖς ὁμοειδέσιν ἀτόμοις, ἄνθρωπος· καθ’ ὃ δὲ διαφέρει τῇ ὑποστάσει, Παῦλος. Εἰ οὖν ὁ Χριστὸς ἐνανθρωπισθεὶς, μόνον θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος λέγοιτο παρὰ τῆς Γραφῆς, μόνην ἄρα τὴν καθόλου φύσιν ἡμῶν ἀνείληφεν· ἥτις μὴ ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένη, οὐδὲ ὑφίστασθαι προαποδέδεικται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ Γαβριήλ πρὸς τὴν Παρθένον· “Συλλήψῃ ἐν γαστρὶ, καὶ τέξεις υἱόν, καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦν.” Οὐκ ἄρα μόνῳ τῷ προσηγορικῷ, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι κέκληται ὁ Χριστός· τὸ χωρίζον αὐτὸν τοῖς ὑποστατικοῖς ιδιώμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περιγραπτός.⁴⁵

(The universal “human being” is an appellative name whereas a certain one, for example, Peter and Paul, which has the proper name, is referred to, together with the proper name, also through the universal name. For Paul is also called “human being”, but regarding that which he shares with members of the same species he is called “human being”, whereas regarding that through which he differs in hypostasis, he is called “Paul”. If then Christ when incarnated were called only God and human being in Scripture, he would have assumed only the universal nature, which when not seen in an individual does not exist as has been proved before. But Gabriel indeed said

⁴³ The problem is not seen by SCHÖNBORN, *L’icône du Christ* 219 (note however his translation: “Le commun subsiste dans les individus”); THÜMMEL, *Bilderlehre und Bilderstreit* 47; MEYENDORFF, *L’image du Christ* 116; IDEM, *Le Christ* 253; TOLLEFSEN, *St Theodore the Studite* 87–88. Cf. John Philoponus, *Commentary on De anima* (ed. M. HAYDUCK, *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 15]. Berlin 1897, 307, 33–34): Τῶν καθόλου ἢ μὲν ὑπόστασις ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἑκάστῳ ἐστίν.

⁴⁴ See Anonymus Rashed, *Argument 4* (ed. M. RASHED, *L’héritage aristotelicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité*. Paris 2007, 367, 29–31). On the use of the verb ἀτομῶ in philosophical texts, see RASHED, *L’héritage aristotelicien* 358–360.

⁴⁵ Antirrheticus III, 1, 18 (*PG* 99, 397C6–D9).

to the Virgin: “You will conceive in your womb, and give birth to a son and will call his name Jesus.” Therefore Christ is called not only with the appellative, but also with the proper name, which separates him from the other human beings through the hypostatic idioms, and is therefore circumscribed.⁴⁶)

In this passage Theodore repeats his claim that a nature could not gain hypostasis if it did not exist “in an individual”, ἐν ἀτόμῳ. This time, however, the focus is not on natural and hypostatic idioms but on appellative and proper names. Theodore’s starting point is the human species where he juxtaposes the appellative “human being”, which denotes the common nature, and proper names such as “Peter” and “Paul”, which denote individuals. In a second step he creates an analogy with the human element in the incarnated Word, juxtaposing the human nature with the proper name “Jesus”. This name then becomes the core of the individualised humanity. Of it are predicated all characteristics that separate the flesh from other human individuals. Accordingly “being seen in an individual”, ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένη could be rephrased not only as “being seen in Peter”, ἐν Πίτρῳ θεωρουμένη, but also as “being seen in Jesus”, ἐν Ἰησοῦ θεωρουμένη. At this point a comparison with the Late Antique Christological discourse is instructive. Many theologians of the fifth to seventh centuries were not prepared to attribute the name “Jesus” exclusively to the flesh, for fear that such usage might give the impression that the incarnated Word were divided into two entities. For Monophysite authors it was clear that “Jesus” could only denote the divine Word. This view finds its most concise expression in Pseudo-Dionysius’ famous statement that in the incarnation the simple Jesus had become composite⁴⁷. Chalcedonian authors displayed the same discomfort. Leontius of Byzantium who criticises Theodore of Mopsuestia for distinguishing the human being Jesus from the divine Word refrains from using the name “Jesus” in his own arguments⁴⁸. This concern was not shared by Theodore, no doubt because Nestorianism was no longer a threat⁴⁹.

* * *

To conclude: in his *Third Antirrheticus* Theodore the Stoudite claimed that the flesh assumed by the Word was not the universal human nature but an individual or a certain human being, endowed with hypostatic idioms, which could be depicted on images. In order to avoid accusations of Nestorianism he declared that the hypostatic idioms of the flesh did not constitute a hypostasis of its own and that the flesh could therefore be assumed into the one hypostasis of the Word. When constructing his arguments he made use of older texts. An important source of inspiration was an excerpt from John Philoponus’ treatise *Arbiter* that was included in the *Doctrina Patrum*, together with glosses by an unknown Chalcedonian theologian. In one argument Theodore follows the Chalcedonian glossator in rejecting Philoponus’ view that hypostatic idioms only distinguish from each other members of the same species. Yet in another argument he reproduces a definition of hypostasis that had been formulated by Philoponus in order to explain what he means by a certain human being. As a result he can no longer uphold the difference between hypostasis on the one hand and certain human being or individual on the other, which was the mainstay of his icon theology. This is not the only

⁴⁶ The participle τὸ χωρίζον, despite being in the nominative, must refer back to τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι. See also the translation in CATTOI, Theodore 94.

⁴⁷ Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, I, 4 (ed. B. R. SUCHLA, Corpus Dionysiacum I: De divinis nominibus [Patristische Texte und Studien 33], Berlin – New York 2000, 113, 9).

⁴⁸ Leontius of Byzantium, Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos (492, 15–19 DALEY).

⁴⁹ See TOLLEFSEN, St Theodore the Studite 89–90. Meyendorff suggests that Theodore is indebted to the Antiochene School, see MEYENDORFF, L’image 116–117; IDEM, Le Christ 256.

conceptual problem that we encounter in the *Third Antirrheticus*. Theodore repeatedly declares that the flesh falls under the same general rule as ordinary human individuals. However, this equation is not reflected in his argument. In the case of the general rule and the human application, individual is identical with hypostasis whereas in the case of the flesh the two concepts are distinguished from one another. Theodore does not seem to have been aware of earlier Christological treatises where this problem was avoided. In general, one can say that he went much further in stressing the reality of the human individual Jesus than earlier Chalcedonian theologians.